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Economic Analysis of 
The Proposed North Dakota Wheat Pool - Summary
*
North Dakota Farmers Union has proposed a
wheat pool for marketing durum and hard red
spring (HRS) wheat produced in the state. The
primary objective of the pool would be to enhance
net farm income. However, there are several
concerns about the proposed wheat pool. These
include the effectiveness of the pool in marketing
HRS and durum wheat, the quantities of HRS and
durum wheat that would be handled by the pool,
needed incentive payments under alternative
marketing conditions, how to finance the proposed
incentive payments, and the structural mechanism
necessary to implement the ND Wheat Pool.
Basic Characteristics of the
North Dakota Wheat Industry
Wheat can be divided into common and durum
wheat.  Common wheat is used to produce flour for
bread, rolls, muffins, cakes, and crackers.  Durum
wheat is used for pasta. Common wheat  is divided
into four classes: hard red winter (HRW), hard red
spring (HRS), soft red winter (SRW), and white
wheat. For protein ranging between 11.5 percent
and 14.5 percent, there is substantial substitution
between HRS wheat and HRW wheat, but durum
wheat is hardly substitutable with other wheats. 
North Dakota produces about 85 percent of the
durum wheat and 50 percent of the HRS wheat
produced in the United States. North Dakota’s
market share for durum wheat is about 60 percent
of U.S. consumption.  The United States imports
about 24 million bushels (0.67 million metric tons)
of durum wheat, mainly from Canada, and also
exports about 45 million bushels (1.23 million
metric tons) of durum wheat.  North Dakota’s
market share of HRS wheat is about 40 percent of
U.S. consumption.  The United States imports
about 45 million bushels (1.23 million metric tons)
of HRS wheat, mainly from Canada, and exports
about 239 million bushels (6.8 million metric tons).
What Is a Marketing Pool
and How Does It Operate?
Purpose of a Pool
The main purpose of a market pool is to
provide additional revenue to its members through
(1) improved marketing efficiency and (2) market
power.   There  may  be  efficiency   gains   from
handling larger volumes of grain, logistic
advantage, and  entrusting marketing decisions to
trained specialists, who have greater access to
information about available supplies and market
opportunities than individual producers.  A market
pool also may be able to exercise limited market
power.  A pool exerts market power to the extent
that it can raise the price of a commodity by
restricting supply, or by effectively discriminating
between markets—offering higher prices in some
market segments, and lower prices in others, in
order to maximize net revenue. 
Market Pool and Operation
  A market pool is an arrangement by which
producers market their crops collectively. This
arrangement is formalized by means of a marketing
agreement between a cooperative and its members.
The marketing agreement is a legal instrument2
which outlines the rights and responsibilities of
both producers and their cooperative.
A market pool combines the crops of many
producers.  Marketing functions are performed by
specialists or professional staffs.  The proceeds are
divided among pool members with each member
receiving the same average price for each unit of
commodity delivered to the pool.  However,
adjustments are often made to reflect differences
among pool members in commodity quality,
transportation costs, or services rendered. The
costs of operating the pool are deducted from the
proceeds of the sale of the commodity. In a typical
case, the producer receives an advance payment
when he delivers the commodity. As commodities
of the pool are sold, an interim payment may be
made. Once the pool is liquidated, operating
expenses and other costs are deducted and the
remaining proceeds are divided among pool
members in a final payment. 
Voluntary and Mandatory Pools
In a voluntary pool, producers are free to either
join the pool or stay outside.  This is contrasted
with mandatory pooling, as exemplified by the
Canadian Wheat Board (CWB) system. Another
form of voluntary pool is a contractual pool; under
this alternative, farmers sign a contract to deliver
a specified portion of their production to the pool.
Farmers who have contracted with the pool should
be able to obtain the average price over the year.
Also, a typical contract with producers is for more
than one year. Hence, under this system, the pool
can make a longer term marketing plan, which
provides more stability in operating the pool than
a pure voluntary pool. Marketing pools in the
United States are all voluntary contractual pools.
One of them is the Farmers Rice Cooperative
located at Sacramento, California.
Advantages and Disadvantages
of a Marketing Pool
Advantages of a marketing pool are (1) to
make marketing decisions at a specialized level, (2)
to reduce price risk, (3) to establish more orderly
marketing and increased price stability, (4) to
provide producers with higher than market wide
average returns, (5) to improve quality and
quantity control, and (6) to promote unity of
purpose among producers. 
Disadvantages of a marketing pool are (1)
delay in receipt of full payment, (2) change to
cooperative marketing philosophy, (3) loss of
marketing control by the producers, (4) possible
inadequate pool size, (5) loss of some short-term
marketing opportunities, and (6) producer
misunderstanding of the need for capital retention.
Can the Pool Exercise Market
Power to Maximize its Revenue?
Benefits of North Dakota
Durum Wheat Pool
Table 1 shows the quantities and prices of
durum wheat under competitive and alternative
pooling scenarios under two different types of pool:
North Dakota pool and joint ND/Canada pool.
Alternative market shares considered are 50
percent of the U.S. domestic consumption for the
ND pool and 80 percent for the joint pool. In both
cases, the pool seeks to exert market power by
restricting sales to the domestic market and  forcing
up the domestic price, relative to competitive
market conditions.
The ND Pool:  Under the competitive market
scenario, the quantity of durum wheat supplied by
North Dakota is 41.47 million bushels at a market
price of $3.50 per bushel, given a 50 percent
market share. The domestic revenue is $144.51
million. The total revenue, including revenue from
the world market, is $220.3 million. 3
Table 1.  Quantities and Prices of Durum Wheat Under
Competitive Market, North Dakota Pool, and Joint Options
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Competitive Market
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*The North Dakota Pool is based on 50% market share and the 
  Joint Pool is based on 80% market share in the U.S. domestic market.   
Under the unlimited quantity reduction
scenario, the pool is allowed to reduce the
quantity supplied to maximize the pool’s revenue. 
Given a 50 percent market share, the pool
reduces its supply of durum wheat from 41.47
million bushels to 28.99 million bushels to
increase the price of durum wheat from $3.50 per
bushel to $4.40 per bushel.  The remaining
durum wheat would be sold in the world market
at the competitive market price. The world price
decreases from $3.50 per bushel to $3.46, as the
pool increases the supply of durum wheat in the
world market.  Revenue from durum wheat
exports is $117.98  million under the 50 percent
market share case.  Total revenue is $245.43
million, which is the sum of the revenue from
domestic sales and revenue from the world
market. The increase in total revenue under this
scenario, relative to the competitive scenario, is
$25.14 million.
Under the 10 percent reduction scenario, the
pool’s supply is 10 percent lower than the
competitive market supply.  The pool supply is
larger than under the unlimited quantity reduction
scenario, but prices are much lower. Total
revenue under this scenario is $231.3 million,
which includes revenue from both domestic and
foreign sales. The increase in total revenue under
this scenario, relative to the competitive market
scenario, is $10.97 million. Under the 15 percent
reduction scenario, the pool supply is 15 percent
lower than the competitive market supply. The
increase in total revenue under this scenario,
relative to the competitive scenario, is $15.49
million.
The Joint Pool: Under the competitive
market scenario, both countries supply 66.06
million bushels at the market price of $3.50,
resulting in domestic revenue of $231.21 million,
given a 80 percent market share. Total revenue,
including revenue from foreign sales, is $340.3
million. 
Under the unlimited quantity reduction
scenario, the quantity of durum wheat supplied
by the pool is reduced substantially from 66.06
million bushels under the competitive scenario to
38.90 million bushels. The domestic price of
durum wheat increases from $3.50 per bushel to
$7.46 per bushel. Total revenue under this
scenario could reach $474.85 million, which is
the sum of domestic sales revenue ($289.35
million) and export sales revenue ($185.50
million). The increase in total revenue under this
scenario, compared with the competitive market
scenario, is $134.5 million. However, the pool
could be constrained in raising the domestic
price.  If the domestic price exceeds the world
price by more than the  transportation costs plus
handling charges at ports, other exporting
countries could export to the United States and
the domestic price would decrease.    
Under the 10 percent reduction scenario,
total revenue from domestic sales is $265.10
million and export revenue is $128.4 million. The
increase in total revenue under this scenario,
compared with the competitive market scenario,4
Table 2.  Quantities and Prices of Spring Wheat Under
Competitive Market, North Dakota Pool, and Joint Options
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Quantity Supplied by Pool (million bu)
World Price ($/bu)
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*The North Dakota Pool is based on 40% market share and the Joint Pool
   is based on 65%  market share in the U.S. domestic market.
is $53.17 million. Total revenue under the 15
percent reduction scenario is larger than under
the 10 percent reduction scenario because of
higher domestic prices.  The increase in total
revenue under this scenario, relative to the
competitive market scenario, is $74.82 million.
North Dakota Hard Red
Spring Wheat Pool
Since North Dakota supplies less than 50
percent of the hard wheat consumed in the United
States, market shares considered are 40 percent
of U.S. domestic consumption in the ND pool
and 65 percent in the joint pool. The domestic
price under the competitive market scenario is
$3.15 per bushel.
The ND Pool: The quantities of hard wheat
supplied by North Dakota in the pooling option is
112.67 million bushels. Total revenue from
domestic sales under the competitive market
scenario is $355.121 million (Table 2). 
When the pool maximizes its profit by
restricting its supply, the quantity of hard wheat
supplied by the pool decreases to 105.33 million
bushels with a 40 percent market share. 
However, there is a small increase in the price of
HRS wheat under this scenario because of a high
degree of substitution between HRS and HRW
wheat.  The increase in total revenue, relative to
the competitive scenario, is $3.43 million. Under
both 10 percent and 15 percent reduction
scenarios, increases in total revenue are
insubstantial.
The Joint Pool: Quantity of hard wheat
supplied is 183.13 million bushels with a 65
percent market share. Total revenue from
domestic sales under the competitive market
scenario is $577.08 million. 
When the pool maximizes its profit by
restricting its supply optimally, the quantity of
hard wheat supplied by the pool decreases to
164.78 million bushels, given a 65 percent
market share.  However, there is only a small
increase in the price of HRS wheat under this
unlimited quantity reduction scenario because of
a high degree of substitution between HRW and
HRS wheat. The increase in total revenue is $9.4
million. Under both 10 percent and 15 percent
reduction scenarios, changes in the pool’s total
revenue from both domestic and export sales are
$9.37 million and $11.41 million, respectively. 
Benefits for the Canadian
Durum Wheat Producers
Canadian producers would derive substantial
benefits from cooperation with the ND pool.
Since the CWB has mandatory pooling, there
would be no free riders and consequently
producers could get higher returns than the ND
pool members. 5
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Figure 2. Average Price Received by Members of the
Hard Red Spring Wheat Pool
Year






















Increases in the CWB’s revenue from the
pool operation for durum wheat range between
$60.6 million under the 100 percent scenario
(Canadian exports to the United States equal the
average level for the last five years) and $52.7
million under the 60 percent scenario (Canadian
exports to the United States are 60 percent of the
average for the last five years) when the pool
price is $5.00 per bushel. As the pool price
decreases, additional revenue for the CWB also
decreases.  
Increases in the CWB’s revenue from the
pool operation for HRS wheat range between
$64.5 million with the 100 percent scenario and
$52.8 million with the 60 percent scenario when
the pool price is $3.50 per bushel. However,
when the pool price is set at $3.20, increases in
the CWB’s revenue are $9.3 million with the 100
percent  scenario and become negative with the
other  scenarios.
The Long-Run Effects of the Pool
If the pool succeeds in raising the domestic
price, this may induce an increase in production.
The increased supply would weaken the pool’s
market power and make the pool operation less
effective. The pool operation was simulated for
10 years from 1999 to 2008 to evaluate the
effects of increased supply on the pool operation.
The pool prices considered in this analysis are
$5.00 per bushel, $4.60 per bushel, $4.20 per
bushel, and $3.80 per bushel for durum wheat
and $3.50 per bushel and $3.20 per bushel for
HRS wheat. 
Average prices of durum wheat received by
the pool members under alternative pool prices
are shown in Figure 1. When the pool price is set
at $5.00 per bushel, average prices received by
producers are $4.40 per bushel in 1999,
decreasing to $4.12 per bushel in 2000, and
stabilizing at $4.17 per bushel for the remaining
period. As  the pool price decreases, the average
price received by producers also declines.
However, average prices received by farmers
under alternative pool prices are much higher
than the competitive market price ($3.50),
indicating that the pool operation for durum
wheat is beneficial in the short and long run.  
Average prices of HRS wheat received by the
pool members under the alternative pool prices
are shown in Figure 2. When the pool price is set
at $3.50 per bushel, average prices received by
producers range between $3.32 per bushel in
1999 and $3.31 per bushel in 2000. When the
pool price is set at $3.20 per bushel, average
prices received by producers are still higher than
the competitive price, implying that the pool will
provide additional revenue to producers in both
the short and long run.  6
Can the Pool Improve
Marketing Efficiency?
Management and Operational Efficiency
Long-term viability of a pool may come to
depend on operational efficiencies or competitive
advantages that are not shared by other grain
trading firms.  Among the areas where the pool
could develop competitive advantages are grain
blending, logistics, and strategic quality
management. As the pool’s market share
increases from 50 percent to 90 percent, it is
estimated that producers could receive efficiency
gains ranging from $0.165 to $0.284 per bushel
for durum wheat and $0.074 to $0.09 per bushel
for HRS.
Optimal Length of the Contracts 
The minimum required contract length for
the North Dakota pool would be four or five
years.  That is the time required for payoffs to
stabilize, based on supply response assumptions
in the analysis.   
Market Strategies
The pool should adopt the following
marketing strategies: (1) to provide consistent
quality wheat for domestic and foreign customers
through careful handling, cleaning, blending, and
storage; (2) to establish long-term sale contracts
with domestic and foreign customers through
customized wheat quality; (3) to use quantity
premiums to attract greater volumes to the pool
and limit the free rider problem; and (4) to
provide efficient risk management for its





The pool would collect wheat from member
producers utilizing authorized local grain
elevators. The grain elevators would contract
with the pool to maintain variety segregation and
the level of quality control required by the pool. 
Wheat would be delivered by member producers
according to their delivery commitments,
arranged at the time of sign up. Wheat is either
cleaned and blended at the local elevator or
shipped to larger regional elevators for cleaning
and/or blending to meet or exceed quality factors,
as determined by the pool and its customers, with
input from technical experts in the market.  After
blending and grading,  it could be sold to either
the domestic or foreign markets, depending on the
quality standards required by those markets.  A
portion of wheat could be processed into
semolina for durum wheat or flour for spring
wheat by the pool and sold to domestic and
foreign food processors. The pool could directly
ship wheat from local elevators to domestic
processors and contract with grain companies to
ship durum wheat to international markets.
Scheduled Payments
The initial payment would be paid to
producers upon delivery of wheat to the local
elevator.  The initial payment would equal a
percentage of current market price or the CCC
loan rate for wheat in that county.  The delivery
of wheat would be spread out over the marketing
year to ease the transportation of wheat.  An
interim payment could be made to producers
after the committed volume of wheat is sold.  The
final payment would be made in April or May




The pool would be organized as a
cooperative with an elected board of directors. 
The manager would be responsible for the day-
to-day operation of the pool and would answer to
the board of directors. The pool could be divided
into five divisions: Sales and Marketing,
Membership Promotions, Accounting,
Transportation, and Research. 7
Assuming that the North Dakota Durum
Wheat Pool handles 50 million bushels of durum,
the total estimated operating expense would be 
$1,186,000, or about 2.37 cents per bushel. For
a North Dakota Spring Wheat Pool handling 50
percent of the North Dakota spring wheat crop or
about 136 million bushels, the total estimated
operating expense would be $2,484,000 or about
1.83 cents per bushel. 
Conclusions
The ND Durum Wheat Pool may provide
additional revenue to durum wheat producers by
raising the domestic prices jointly with the CWB
in the North American market.  If such
cooperation is feasible, the domestic price could
be driven substantially higher than the world
equilibrium price, which would work to the
mutual benefit of U.S. and Canadian producers.
The pool also could  provide additional revenue
to its members by improving  marketing
efficiency. Efficiency gains through the pool
operation are estimated to be $0.16 - $0.23 per
bushel for durum wheat.  
On the other hand, the ND Spring Wheat
Pool is less likely to provide additional revenue to
spring wheat producers in the state by raising
domestic prices, even with full cooperation from
the CWB. HRS wheat is highly substitutable
with hard red winter wheat and the pool may not
have enough market power in the North
American market. Efficiency gains also could be
smaller than for durum wheat. Efficiency gains
are estimated to be $0.07 - $0.09 per bushel for
HRS wheat. 
Major Issues and Concerns
Incentive Payments and Contracts
The pool can offer incentive payments to
those who participate in the pool.  The purpose
of this incentive payment is to attract producers
to the pool operation.  In general, higher incentive
payments will attract more participants to the
pool.  The concern is how to finance the incentive
payment.  The payment could come from either
the state government as a form of subsidy or
from the state bank or commercial banks as a
loan.  A state government subsidy might violate
the World Trade Organization (WTO)
agreement, and would require approval of the
North Dakota legislature. If the incentive
payment is subsidy-neutral, it must be financed
by a bank and the pool would be responsible for
the repayment of the loan.  In this case, the pool
would have to arrange  multi-year contracts with
its members; otherwise, members would exit
after receiving the incentive payment.  The
magnitude of the incentive payment, therefore,
should depend upon the contract period and
expected additional revenue from the pool
operation.
Payments to Producers
Payments to producers will be lower than the
domestic price of wheat set by the pool.  The
reason is that only part of the pool’s wheat is
sold at the high domestic price; the remainder is
sold at a lower price in the world market.  In
addition, the pool will have operating expenses
which should be paid from the pool’s revenue. 
The final payment to producers would be the
average price minus the pool’s operating cost per
bushel.  The total payment to the member,
therefore, is lower than the domestic price. 
Because of this difference, members could seek
to exit the pool in order to receive the higher
domestic price. These free riders would weaken
the market power of the pool.
Supply Response
The supply of durum wheat is very elastic in
some regions in the United States.  For instance,
the price elasticity of supply of durum wheat is
2.0 in the desert region and 0.98 in other regions. 
The price elasticity of supply is 0.86 in North
Dakota.  This implies that a 10 percent increase
in the price of durum wheat would induce about
the same percentage increase in supply. To the
extent that additional production is supplied by
free riders, this will weaken the market power of
the pool.  An alternative would be to form a U.S.
durum wheat pool by including producers in all8
durum wheat producing states, mainly Montana,
Minnesota, California, and Arizona. 
Cooperation with the
Canadian Wheat Board
For effective exercise of market power, the
durum wheat pool would require cooperation
from the CWB.  The CWB is capable of
supplying large amounts of durum wheat to
millers in the United States as long as the U.S.
domestic price of durum wheat is higher than
alternative markets, net of shipping costs. 
However, if the ND Wheat Pool and the CWB
cooperate with each other, the two parties can
jointly determine a minimum price of durum
wheat, which would be much higher than the
competitive price in the North American market. 
This cooperation would entail the CWB
restricting its durum wheat exports to the United
States to an agreed level.  As long as  the ND
Wheat Pool and the CWB continue to honor the
agreement, producers in the two countries could
 earn additional revenue.  However, the legality
of such cooperation (if based on an explicit
agreement) would have to be determined.  In
absence of an explicit market-sharing and pricing
agreement, cooperation would have to be
implicit, based on recognition of  mutual
interests.  
On-farm Storage
The carry-over stock at the end of the 1997-
98 marketing year was about 23 million bushels
for durum wheat and 228 million bushels for
hard red spring wheat. Ending stocks for 1998-
99 are projected to be even higher.  The pool may
have to absorb a major portion of these stocks to
effectively exercise its market power, and some
of the remaining stocks could be supplied to the
domestic market by non-members.  Large current
carry-over stocks, therefore, may reduce the
pool’s effective market share and weaken its
market power. An alternative is to export a large
portion of the carry-over stocks under the Export
Enhancement Program (EEP).
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